State v. Puga: How AZ Courts Now Handle Juror Bias in DUI Trials

Background: Why Puga Matters Even Though It’s Not a DUI Case

Effective January 1, 2022, the Arizona Supreme Court eliminated peremptory challenges statewide — the tool that let attorneys remove a prospective juror without stating any reason. Since then, jurors can only be removed “for cause,” meaning the challenging party must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict. Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 18.4(b) and 18.5(h) govern that standard, and the Supreme Court added new commentary in 2022 instructing trial judges to conduct open-ended, non-leading voir dire and to avoid “rehabilitating” hesitant jurors with leading questions designed to extract a rote assurance of fairness.

Puga is the case that tested what those revised rules actually mean in practice — and because DUI jury trials use the identical rules and the identical for-cause standard, the court’s interpretation applies with equal force whether the charge is sexual assault, domestic violence, or driving under the influence.

What Happened in State v. Puga

During jury selection, two prospective jurors disclosed they were themselves sexual assault survivors. The defense moved to strike both for cause. One juror (Juror 10) gave clear, consistent, unprompted assurances that her experience wouldn’t affect her impartiality, and the court seated her without much controversy. The other (Juror 6) gave more equivocal answers — “I don’t know, you know, how that would affect me” — until the trial judge asked a series of closed-ended, leading follow-up questions (“Would you be able to set aside that personal experience?”), after which she eventually agreed she could be fair. The record also showed the juror had a visible emotional reaction — described by both sides as “moist eyes” and a “slight change in tone” — while discussing her own assault.

The trial court denied the motion to strike Juror 6 for cause. She sat on the jury. The defendant was convicted and appealed, arguing the court should have excused her.

The Majority’s Holding: Deference to the Trial Court’s Credibility Calls

The Court of Appeals majority affirmed the conviction, holding that:

• The trial court’s clarifying questions to Juror 6 did not cross into improper “rehabilitation” under Rule 18.5(f) because they sought clarity rather than trying to change her mind about a preconceived opinion.
• Appellate courts must defer heavily to a trial judge’s on-the-spot credibility and demeanor findings, because only the judge in the room can actually observe a juror’s tone and body language — a “cold transcript” can’t fully capture that.
• A juror’s continued, repeated assurances of impartiality — even after equivocal initial answers — can constitute “reasonable evidence” supporting the decision not to strike, when weighed against the totality of the record.
• Being a victim of a crime similar to the one charged does not, by itself, disqualify a juror. That principle, rooted in older case law like State v. Rose and reaffirmed post-2022 in State v. Colorado, survived the abolition of peremptory strikes intact.

The Dissent: A Different Read on What the 2022 Rule Change Actually Requires

Presiding Judge Jacobs dissented in part, and his reasoning is arguably the more important part of the opinion for defense-side trial strategy going forward. The dissent argued that:

• The 2022 comment to Rule 18.5(f) specifically warns trial courts against using leading, closed-ended questions to “rehabilitate” a wavering juror into a clean assurance of fairness — and that’s exactly what happened with Juror 6, whose “I think I might” only became “yes” after the court pressed her for certainty.
• Rule 18.5(h)’s “totality of the circumstances” requirement means a court cannot treat a juror’s final, coaxed assurance as a conversation-ending answer — the juror’s earlier equivocation, visible emotional reaction, and personal history all have to be weighed together, not overridden by the last thing she said.
• Before 2022, this kind of borderline juror would simply have been removed with a peremptory strike, with no need to litigate the point. Now that peremptories are gone, the dissent argued, appellate courts have to actually engage with whether the “for cause” standard was properly applied — not wave it off with pure deference — or the elimination of peremptory strikes will leave defendants with materially less protection against seating a biased juror than they had before the rule changed.
• The dissent pointed out that a different prospective juror with objectively less connection to the case (an acquaintance’s daughter, not personal victimization) had been struck for cause earlier in the same voir dire — while Juror 6, a survivor herself with a visible emotional reaction, was not.

The majority prevailed, and the conviction was affirmed. But the dissent’s reasoning signals exactly where future challenges in Arizona criminal — including DUI — jury trials are likely to be fought.

How Puga’s Interpretation Affects DUI Jury Trials

DUI cases raise their own version of the same problem Puga addresses. Jurors regularly disclose personal experience with drunk driving — a family member injured or killed by an impaired driver, a friend arrested for DUI, strong personal views on drinking and driving generally. Under the current rules, here’s what Puga means in practice for a DUI jury trial:

1. A juror’s initial hesitation matters — but it isn’t decisive on its own. If a prospective juror says something like “I don’t know if I could be fully objective about DUI cases” and is later walked into a firmer “yes, I can be fair” through leading follow-up questions, Puga‘s majority says that final assurance can still support seating the juror — while the dissent says the court must weigh the entire exchange, including the initial hesitation, together.
2. How voir dire questions are asked now carries real legal weight. Under the 2022 comment to Rule 18.5(f), open-ended questions (“Tell us about your experience with this”) are favored over leading, closed-ended ones (“You can set that aside, right?”). An attorney’s skill in eliciting a juror’s actual views — rather than a coached yes-or-no — can be the difference between a for-cause strike succeeding or failing.
3. Emotional reactions and demeanor are part of the record — if someone puts them on it. In Puga, it was opposing counsel’s own admission that the juror’s “eyes got glassy” that became part of the appellate record. In a DUI trial, if a juror shows a visible reaction while discussing a family DUI tragedy, getting that reaction stated clearly on the record — not just observed silently — matters for any later appeal.
4. Being personally affected by DUI-related harm doesn’t automatically disqualify a juror. Just as a sexual assault survivor isn’t automatically struck in a sexual assault case, a juror who lost a family member to a drunk driver isn’t automatically struck in a DUI case. The for-cause standard still requires a reasonable ground to believe that specific juror, based on the totality of their answers, cannot be fair — not just an assumption based on their life experience.
5. Appellate review after trial is narrower than many people assume. Puga‘s majority shows that Arizona’s appellate courts will generally defer to a trial judge’s in-person credibility findings on juror bias. That makes getting jury selection right the first time — during trial, before a verdict — far more important than hoping to fix a bad panel on appeal.

What This Means for You

• If your DUI case is going to trial, the jury that hears it is being shaped almost entirely by voir dire questioning — not by after-the-fact strikes — because peremptory challenges no longer exist.
• The specific wording of your attorney’s questions matters legally, not just strategically. Puga shows that how a question is phrased (open-ended vs. leading) can affect whether a biased juror gets struck for cause or stays on the panel.
• A juror’s final “yes, I can be fair” is not automatically the end of the inquiry — but under the current majority rule, it carries significant weight, so your attorney has to build a complete record, not just get one favorable answer.
• Preserving objections in real time is critical. Puga turned partly on whether the defense objected to the court’s questioning as it happened — errors that aren’t objected to at trial are reviewed under a much tougher “fundamental error” standard on appeal.
• Trial experience under the current rules is not the same skill set as trial experience from before 2022. An attorney who has picked juries under this for-cause-only standard, and who understands cases like Puga and State v. Colorado, is working from a fundamentally different playbook than one relying on pre-2022 habits.

Why Trial Experience Matters When the Rules Have Changed This Much

Gordon Thompson has practiced DUI and criminal defense in Arizona since 1982 — 47 years and more than 6,000 clients — including jury selection and trial strategy both before and after the 2022 elimination of peremptory challenges. His practice is limited entirely to DUI and criminal defense in Arizona; he does not divide his practice across other areas of law. As a solo practitioner, clients work with Gordon personally through every stage of the case — voir dire, pretrial motions, negotiations, and trial — not a paralegal or associate.

Understanding how Arizona courts are actually interpreting the post-2022 jury rules — through decisions like Puga — is part of building an effective trial strategy, not just academic reading. If your DUI case may go to trial, that’s a conversation worth having early.

Free Consultation: Call (602) 467-3680 | Text | Contact Gordon Thompson Online

Frequently Asked Questions: State v. Puga & Jury Selection in Arizona DUI Trials

What is State v. Puga about?

State v. Puga is a January 2025 published decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals interpreting how trial courts must handle for-cause juror challenges following the state’s 2022 elimination of peremptory strikes. Although the underlying case involved a sexual assault charge, its interpretation of Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 18.4 and 18.5 applies to jury selection in all Arizona criminal trials, including DUI.

Does State v. Puga apply to DUI cases?

Yes. The rules interpreted in Puga — Rule 18.4(b) governing for-cause challenges and Rule 18.5 governing voir dire procedure — apply uniformly to every Arizona criminal jury trial, including misdemeanor DUI, Extreme DUI, and Super Extreme DUI cases tried in Municipal and Justice Courts.

What did the Arizona Court of Appeals decide in Puga?

The majority held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in seating a juror who initially gave equivocal answers about her impartiality but ultimately provided assurances of fairness, and that appellate courts must defer to a trial judge’s in-person credibility and demeanor findings on juror bias.

What did the dissent in Puga argue?

The dissent argued the trial court improperly “rehabilitated” a wavering juror using leading, closed-ended questions the 2022 rule comment specifically warns against, and that the totality of the juror’s answers — not just her final coaxed assurance — showed a reasonable ground to believe she could not be impartial, meaning she should have been struck for cause.

Can a juror who has personal experience with drunk driving still serve on a DUI jury?

Yes. Under Arizona law, a juror’s personal connection to an issue like drunk driving does not automatically disqualify them. The court must find a reasonable ground, based on the totality of that juror’s specific conduct and answers during voir dire, to believe they cannot render a fair and impartial verdict.

Why does jury selection matter more in Arizona now than before 2022?

Because peremptory challenges no longer exist, attorneys can no longer remove a juror they’re concerned about without a valid for-cause basis. Cases like State v. Puga show that the specific questions asked during voir dire, and how thoroughly a potential juror’s answers are developed on the record, can determine whether a biased juror is removed or seated.